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By DavidS. Bogen 
A large proportion of the opinions of the Supreme Court during 
the past two terms have involved the 
employment relationship. This sta-
tistic suggests that the Supreme 
Court is eager to interpret federal 
labor law and is encouraging litiga-
tion. Analysis, however, demon-
strates that the suggestion is one 
more example of the adage that sta-
tistics lie. Almost half the cases in-
volve employment discrimination 
where the general tenor of Court de-
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cisions is to increase the difficulties of 
plaintiff's suits. In the more tradi-
tional area of labor relations, the 
plethora of opinions reveal great 
deference to the National Labor 
Relations Board which in turn should 
discourage appeals from Board orders 
and reduce the conflicts between the 
Board and the Circuit Courts. Thus, 
the Court's decisions should result in 
keeping business out of the federal 
courts. 
LABOR DECISIONS IN 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
It is only fitting that the founda-
tions for this analysis should be laid 
by the construction unions. In the 
past few years they have suffered a 
number of legislative and judicial set-
backs. For many years the construc-
tion unions have criticized the 
Supreme Court's decision in Denver 
Building1 where the Court found it 
was an unfair labor practice for a 
union to picket a general contractor 
to protest his use of a non-union sub~ 
contractor. In 1975 they sought to 
overturn that decision by legislation 
(HR5900), but the legislation was 
vetoed by President Ford. In 1977 
their democratic friends in Congress 
double-crossed them and failed to 
pass the bill. Now the Supreme Court 
in two decisions has undercut con-
struction union expectations in 
another area. In the Pipefittersz case the 
Court adopted the board's "right of 
control" standard. It held that unions 
committed an unfair labor practice 
by striking to force an employer to 
honor its contractual agreement not 
to use pre-finished products where 
the use of pre-finished products was 
mandated by someone other than 
that employer. The dissent argued 
that the union was only trying to 
force the subcontractor to abide by its 
agreement with the union and would 
be satisfied if the subcontractor en-
tirely terminated work even if the 
general contractor hired another sub-
contractor who would use pre-
finished goods on that job. Justice 
White for the majority saw that an 
object of the refusal to work was to 
force the general contractor to re-
tract its requirement that pre-
finished goods be used. Thus the re-
fusal to work for the subcontractor 
Was done with an eye for its effect on 
the general contractor. The legality of 
the collective bargaining agreement 
Provision did not insulate the strike to 
enforce it from the strictures of 
section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National 
Labor Relations Act. 
Although the Court's analysis 
seemed to make the general con-
tractor the primary employer, the 
spectre of Denver Bldg. must haunt 
construction unions if they attempt 
to picket the general contractor to 
force it to cease doing business with 
firms making pre-finished goods. The 
impact of picketing the general con-
tractor to compel it to allow all piping 
to be done on site is not to preserve 
work for the general contractor's 
employees but for the employees of 
independent subcontractors. Denver 
Bldg. suggests that picketing is sec-
ondary where an object is not the 
working conditions of the picketed 
employer's employees but the rela-
tionship of that employer with 
another employer. Indeed, allowing 
such picketing leads to the anomoly 
of employees of the subcontractor 
picketing the general contractor at 
the job site and refusing to cross their 
own picket line so that the refusal to 
work prohibited in Pipefitters is pro-
tected under the proviso to 8(b)(4) 
permitting employees to honor a law-
ful picket line. Even stranger would 
be the spectacle of a general contrac-
tor establishing separate gates so that 
unionized employees of the subcon-
tractor would enter the job while 
picketing it at another entrance. The 
Board specifically left open the issue 
of whether the general contractor or 
the manufacturer of the prefabri-
cated material were primary em-
ployers. The Chamber of Commerce 
amicus brief argued that a primary 
employer would exist only where 
right of control coincided with a bar-
gaining relationship. 
The possibility that no primary em-
ployer exists influenced the D.C. 
court of appeals in the decision which 
was overturned by the Court. If the 
Court eventually finds that picket-
ing the general contractor to pre-
serve work for employees of a sub-
contractor is also secondary, it will 
have sharply restricted the applica-
tion of the work preservation excep-
tion to 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). 
Meanwhile Justice White was so 
entranced by the notion that a strike 
to enforce a lawful collective bar-
gaining agreement provision might 
be an unfair labor practice that this 
term he did it again to the construc-
tion industry. In the Iron Workers case,3 
he wrote the majority opinion which 
held that picketing to enforce a law-
ful prehire agreement with a general 
contractor was a violation of section 
8(b)(7) if the union did not secure a 
majority in the eventual work force 
hired by the general. 
Although Brennan and Marshall 
had led the dissenters in the Pipefitters 
case, their concern to protect the in-
dividual worker from being forced to 
live under a union contract despite 
majority non-union sentiment led 
them into White's camp in Iron 
Workers. This time it was Justices 
Blackmun and Stevens who joined 
with Stewart in dissent to argue that 
picketing to enforce an agreement 
permitted by §8(f) was not picketing 
for organizational or recognitional 
purpose. 
Justice White minimizes the im-
pact of the prohibition on picketing 
to enforce 8(f) agreements by noting 
that voluntary observance of such 
agreements is "the normal course 
of events"; but with increasing 
numbers of open shop construction 
firms striving to avoid the ineffi-
ciency of jurisdictional work rules, 
the decision here, as in Pipefitters, may 
encourage the trend against 
unionization. 
Unions suffered another setback 
in the Writers Guild4 case. The guild 
attempted to discipline its members 
who crossed a picket line in order to 
perform their regular supervisory 
duties. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the Board's decision that the guild had 
violated section 8(b)(1)(B) in that such 
discipline restrained or coerced the 
employer "in the selection of his rep-
resentatives for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining or the adjustment 
of grievances." The dissent of Justice 
Stewart joined by Justices Brennan, 
Marshall and Stevens argued that 
labor unions should be able to en-
force their members' agreement to 
honor a picket line where the union 
does not attempt to dictate how its 
supervisor members perform their 
duties when the duties are per-
formed. The dissenters point out that 
an employer can protect itself by pre-
venting supervisory employees from 
joining the union. The majority, 
while acknowledging union power to 
discipline supervisory members who 
cross the picket line to perform rank 
and file work, affirmed the Board's 
decision that it was an unfair labor 
practice to discipline employees for 
performing their supervisory duties 
during the strike. 
Unions have not always lost 
recently. Two cases this past term re-
sulted in support for union claims of 
organizational rights. In Eastex Cor-
porations, the employer prohibited dis-
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tribution of a union newslettP.r that 
encouraged members to write their 
legislators to oppose incorporation of 
the state "right to work" statute into 
the state constitution and urged 
workers to register to vote so they 
could work to defeat President Nixon 
who had vetoed a bill to increase the 
minimum wage. The employer ar-
gued that these portions of the news-
letter did not deal with the relation-
ship between the employer and its 
employees so it was not protected 
activity under section 7 of the Act. 
The Supreme Court, however, up-
held the Board's determination that 
the newsletter was protected be-
cause it was for "mutual aid and 
protection" even though it did not 
involve action directed against the 
employer. Since the employer failed 
to show any harm to its managerial 
interests in the distribution of the 
newsletter, the attempt to suppress it 
was an impermissible interference 
with employee's Section 7 rights. 
Justices Burger and Rehnquist dis-
sented, arguing that employer prop-
erty rights should give way only 
where necessary to protect rights of 
self-organization and collective bar-
gaining which were not involved in 
this case. The majority, however, 
found that the Act protected at-
tempts to improve the position of 
workers through channels outside 
the immediate employer-employee 
relationship. 
The union was victorious again in 
Beth Israel Hospital6 where the Board 
ordered the hospital to·permit solici-
tation and distribution of union 
materials in the hospital cafeteria. 
The Supreme Court affirmed this 
order, pointing out that most of the 
patrons of the cafeteria were em-
ployees and that the hospital failed to 
produce any evidence that distribu-
tion in the cafeteria was harmful to 
patient care. 
The unions also had some success 
in the 197 6 term of the Court. In Nolde 
Brothers, 7 the Court upheld a Court of 
Appeals' order compelling arbitra-
tion of a dispute which arose after the 
contract had been terminated. Nolde 
Brothers had a collective bargaining 
agreement with a union represent-
ing its employees which provided, 
inter alia, for severance pay and for ar-
bitration. The contract provided that 
after its expiration date the terms 
would remain in effect until either 
party gave seven days' notice to ter-
minate. After bargaining unsuccess-
fully for a new agreement, the union 
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gave notice to terminate. A few days 
after the contract terminated, Nolde 
hoisted the Union by its own petard-
closing the plant and claiming that 
since the contract had expired, it was 
no longer under any duty to pay sev-
erance pay. The union screamed that 
the right to severance pay accrued 
during the term of the agreement and 
thus applied whenever an employee 
was terminated thereafter. It then 
sued for severance pay asking that 
the arbitrator interpret the contract. 
The contract did not specifically state 
whether the arbitration provision 
survived for questions of interpreta-
tion involving events occurring after 
the termination of the contract. 
Justice Burger, citing the many cases 
beginning with the Warrior and GulfB 
which favored arbitration upheld the 
Court of Appeals' order to arbitrate 
the dispute. 
Stewart and Rehnquist dissented, 
pointing out that the basic reasons 
behind the presumption of arbi-
trability did not exist here. With the 
termination of the contract, the 
union was no longer under any obli-
gation to forego a strike. In this con-
text arbitration did not serve as the 
quid pro quo for giving up the right to 
strike. Further, arbitration would not 
prevent disruption of the business 
because there was no longer a con-
tinuing business relationship. Thus 
the dissenters found no agreement to 
arbitrate the issue of post contract 
severence pay. 
One reason underlying arbitration 
to resolve disputes did apply here and 
it provides a common theme with the 
Pipefitters, Iron Workers, Writers Guild, 
Eastex, and Beth Israel cases. Ever since 
the Court held that federal law 
governed contract interpretation in 
§301 cases, it has been anxious to 
avoid the flood of cases in the federal 
courts that such a holding would 
seem to engender. Instead it has 
thrust the burden on the arbitrators 
and avoided any serious review of 
their decisions. Consequently, even 
while taking a large number of labor 
cases these past terms, the message of 
the Court has been that the federal 
courts will not be a helpful forum. In 
Nolde the dispute is referred to 
arbitration, while in all the other 
cases previously discussed, the 
Supreme Court indicated that the cir-
cuit courts should defer to the Board's 
determination. 
Deference to the Board was the 
keynote of a unanimous court in up-
holding the Board's determination in 
Bayside Enterprises9 that truckers de-
livering feed from a mill to farmers 
were not agricultural workers for 
purposes of exemption under the 
act. Deference to the administrative 
agency was also apparent under the 
LMRDA. In Steelworkers Local 3489, the 
Court's invalidation of union office 
eligibility criteria which prevented 
over 95% of the membership from 
running for office leaned on the spe-
cial role of the Secretary of Labor in 
administration of the act. 10 Indeed, in 
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. this term, the 
Court even supported the National 
Labor Relations Board's refusal to 
give copies of statements of potential 
witnesses to an employer charged 
with an unfair labor practice.n The 
Court held that the Board satisfied 
its burden of showing that such dis-
closure would interfere with en-
forcement proceeding and therefore 
it was exempted from the Freedom of 
Information Act. 
Although the Supreme Court's 
deference to federal administrative 
agencies should diminish litigation in 
federal courts, the Court was willing 
to let the state courts take on more 
business. In Farmer v. United Brother-
hood, 12 a unanimous Court held that 
state law on intentional infliction of 
emotional distress even during a 
labor dispute is not preempted by the 
NLRA. Justice Powell refused to re-
view the delicate preemption adjust-
ments of prior cases, but reversed a 
Court of Appeals decision which held 
that federal labor law preempted such 
state law. He noted that state law did 
not turn on the existence of a labor 
dispute and that the intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress was not 
protected by labor law. Nevertheless 
he did note that a threat to act either 
in a manner protected by the act 
or forbidden by the act would be 
preempted and cited Linnl3 for the 
proposition that the infliction of 
emotional distress must be for "out-
rageous" conduct and that normally 
robust language in labor disputes 
would not be covered. 
No preemption was also the mes-
sage of two cases this past term. In 
White Motor Company, 14 the Court 
found that feder<!l labor law did not 
preempt state regulation of pension 
plans, although the Court held in a 
subsequent case that the same state 
pension regulation as applied to pen-
sion plans established prior to the 
date of the statute was invalid under 
the contract clause of the constitu-
tion.ls 
Finally, in Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. San 
Diego Co. Dis!. Council of Carpenters, 16 the 
Court held that federal labor law did 
not preempt state trespass laws 
despite arguments that the tres-
passory conduct was either pro-
hibited or protected by the National 
Labor Relations Act. The Court 
pointed out that the state trespass 
law focused on the location of the 
activity, while the federal prohibi-
tions did not. The more significant 
preemption problem was posed by the 
possibility that trespassory picketing 
could be protected by section 7 of the 
National Labor Relations Act. The 
Court noted that the employer has no 
relief under federal law for trespass 
by union organizers, so preemption 
of state court jurisdiction would 
permit an unprotected infringement 
of his property rights to go un-
remedied. On the other hand, unions 
could secure adequate protection of 
their rights by invoking the Board 
processes against an employer who 
violates the Act. "Because the asser-
tion of state jurisdiction in cases of 
this kind does not create a significant 
risk of prohibition of protected con-
duct, we are unwilling to presume 
that Congress intended ... to de-
prive the California courts of 
jurisdiction." 
Accommodation to the state was a 
theme of the last traditional case to 
be discussed: Walsh v. Schlecht.l7 The 
Court affirmed a state court decision 
requiring ·a general contractor to 
make contribution on behalf of em-
ployees of subcontractors to various 
funds in which a union not repre-
senting those employees was a 
trustee. The LMRA prohibits pay-
ments by an employer to a union 
except under specific conditions in 
which the union is a trustee and rep-
resents the beneficiaries. Although 
the contract was to be construed 
pursuant to federal law, Justice 
Brennan found that the appropriat·e 
way to construe the contract was to 
avoid statutory violation. Thus he 
approved the Oregon courts' con-
struction which found the general 
contractor obligated to contribute to 
funds measured by hours subcon-
tractor's employees worked al-
though the funds were not available 
to such employees. 
In sum, the Court's decisions in the 
traditional labor law area over the 
Past two terms have demonstrated 
great deference to federal adminis-
trative agencies and to state law. If 
this hint is taken by the circuit courts, 
the result should reduce the cases 
brought in the federal courts. 
PUBLIC SECTOR 
Two recent decisions involved the 
relationship between the Govern-
ment and the public sector union. The 
appearance of such cases on the 
Supreme Court level reflects in-
creasing organization and activity by 
public sector unions at local govern-
mental levels. Indeed, the cases may 
be more important as symbols of the 
growing importance of public sector 
unionism than for what they held. 
The first, City of Madison v. Wis. Emp. 
Rei. Com'nrs was not difficult for the 
Court to decide. The Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Commission had 
found that a school board committed 
an unfair labor practice by per-
mitting a teacher to speak against an 
agency shop proposal at a public 
meeting. Justice Burger for the Court 
noted that merely presenting views at 
a public meeting was not negotia-
tion. Negotiation may properly be 
limited to private sessions between 
the government management and 
union. However, singling out em-
ployees of government and exclud-
ing them from the speech rights 
afforded all other citizens at an open 
meeting violates the First Amend-
ment. Brennan, Marshall and Stew-
art all concurred. Stewart empha-
sized the lack of a legitimate state 
interest in prohibiting the teacher's 
speech under these circumstances 
while Brennan and Marshall focused 
on the implications of discrimination 
in a public forum. 
While the Court had no trouble 
affirming the right to oppose the 
agency shop, it had a little more diffi-
culty with the agency shop itself. In 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education,19 
teachers in Detroit sought to invali-
date an agency shop provision as an 
abridgement of their rights of free-
dom of speech and association. The 
Court held that Hansonzo and Streetzr 
applied as a constitutional,matter to 
public employment, . so that the 
agency shop could be required of all 
public employees, but funds col-
lected could not be used to support 
ideological causes to which the 
teacher was opposed. 
Insofar as the service charge is used 
to finance expenditures by the union 
for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining, contract administration, and 
grievance adjustment" wrote Justice 
Stewart, the agency shop is valid. But, 
he continued, contributions may not 
be compelled for "ideological activi-
ties unrelated to collective bargain-
ing." At this point, where a line might 
be drawn to disentangle public sector 
bargaining and union political activ-
ity, Justice Stewart draws instead at-
tention to the problems of drawing a 
line. 
The process of establishing a written col-
lective bargaining agreement prescribing 
terms and conditions of public employ-
ment may require not merely concord at the 
bargaining table, but subsequent ap-
proval by other public authorities; related 
budgetary and appropriations decisions 
might be seen as an integral part of the bar-
gaining process. 
He then refuses to draw a line in this 
case because the specific activities 
have not been spelled out-thus sug-
gesting that the problem of agency 
shop will reappear in the court. 
Justices Powell, Burger and Black-
mun have no difficulty drawing that 
line-they would find the agency 
shop in the public sector a violation of 
the First Amendment in that the exis-
tence of the union bargaining is in-
herently political. Thus the agency 
shop means that government, not a 
private employer, is forcing persons 
to pay money to support ideas which 
they oppose. If the dissent had pre-
vailed, the case might have signifi-
cantly affected both public sector 
union growth and possibly raised 
questions about agency shop in the 
private sector. The majority, how-
ever, maintains the status quo and 
postpones for another day the tough 
questions of drawing lines in the 
public sector. 
CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
By far the largest group of cases 
involving the employment relation-
ship both this term and last are those 
involving the laws against discrimi-
nation. Here again, as in the tradi-
tional cases, a theme of discouraging 
cases in federal court exists. Unlike 
the traditional cases, however, in the 
civil rights area, resort to federal 
courts is discouraged by substantive 
or procedural decisions rather than 
deference to administrative or state 
bodies. 
While Stewart seemed a lonely dis-
senter in many traditional cases, he 
has become the spokesman for the 
court in most of the civil rights cases. 
In Dothard v. Rawlinsonzz he reaf-
firmed the application of Griggsz3 in 
Title VII cases to permit a prima facie 
case to be made aut by showing a 
continued on page 3 5 
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neutral employment practice had a 
disproportionate racial or sexual 
effect. In Rawlinson a height and 
weight requirement for correctional 
officers had a disproportionate im-
pact on women and no attempt was 
made to justify it. Indeed, three 
justices concurred on grounds 
that while such requirements could 
be justified by showing a need for the 
"appearance of strength," the prison 
system made no such argument. 
Lest plaintiff's counsel be carried 
away, Stewart's decision in Hazelwood 
v. U.S.Z4 made it clear that the use of 
statistics to demonstrate a prima facie 
case would be carefully scrutinized. 
The relevant statistics are not just a 
comparison of the work force to the 
available pool of workers, but the 
work force hired after the Act be-
came applicable (in Hazelwood, the 
1972 extension to governmental 
units). Further, the remand con-
tained directions to make a careful 
review of factors to determine the ap-
propriate applicable pool of workers. 
Defendants' ability to rebut a prima 
facie case was enhanced in Furnco.zs 
The Court agreed with the Seventh 
Circuit that plaintiffs had made a 
prima facie showing of discrimina-
tion by proving they had done every-
thing within their power to apply for 
employment and that they were 
qualified. The Court, however, noted 
that the prima facie case raises the in-
ference that the job denial was based 
on race. Consequently, proof of the 
racial composition of the work force 
can be used to rebut the inference of 
improper intent. 
Defense counsel in civil rights 
actions could even find comfort in 
Stewart's opinion in Rawlinson. He up-
held the refusal to employ women in 
contact correctional positions (75% of 
the jobs) as a bona fide occupational 
qualification, saying that guards of 
the opposite sex would lead to a 
greater likelihood of violence. Mar-
shall and Brennan dissented on the 
grounds that proof of such greater 
likelihood was wholly inadequate and 
based on sex stereotyping. Further, 
"to deprive women of job opportuni-
ties because of threatened behavior of 
convicted criminals is to turn social 
priorities upside down." 
The greater latitude in justifying 
employer action was reflected in TWA 
v. Hardison26 in which the Court over 
another dissent by Brennan and 
Marshall held that to require an em-
ployer to bear more than a de minimus 
cost to accommodate an. employee's 
religious beliefs would be an "undue 
hardship." 
Plaintiffs in Title VII suits had even 
worse news in the Teamsters27 case 
which overturned the fairly con-
sistent determinations of lower 
courts. The Court held that a depart-
mental seniority system which was 
racially neutral except for its effect to 
perpetuate pre-Act discrimination in 
assigning to departments was insu-
lated by section 703(h) of Title VIII so 
that seniority expectations of exist-
ing employees should not be dis-
turbed. While approving the Frankszs 
determination that failure to apply 
for a job did not bar individuals from 
a compensatory fictional seniority 
remedy, Justice Stewart said that the 
burden was on the plaintiffs to prove 
they would have applied but for the 
discrimination and that a showing 
that the employee was in the less re-
munerative department and that the 
policy of discrimination was well 
known was insufficient to discharge 
the burden. 
The integrity of the seniority 
system was the keynote of another 
decision of the 1976 term. In United 
Air Lines v. Evans, 29 Justice Stevens 
wrote that where an individual's 
claim for unlawful discharge was time 
barred, it should have no impact on an 
attack on the seniority. system. Con-
sequently, failure to grant seniority 
for the previous employment was still 
protected by 703(h). 
The time bar became a more likely 
occurrence as a result of the Court's · 
decision in Robbins & Meyers3o which 
stated that attempts to pursue a dis-
charge through the grievance pro-
cedure would not toll the time limits 
for filing with EEOC. 
Title VII plaintiffs' attorneys may 
also be concerned with the East Texas 
Motor Freigh/31 case which found that 
the district court appropriately failed 
to find a class action where the named 
plaintiffs would not have been eligible 
for the jobs in which discrimination 
was alleged. 
A final discouraging note for plain-
tiff suits is found this term in 
Christianburg Garmenf32 where the 
Court said it was appropriate to 
award defendant attorney fees for 
frivolous or unreasonable Title VII 
suits even if the plaintiff acted in sub-
jective good faith. · 
The net effect of these cases is to 
make recovery in civil rights suits less 
likely for individual plaintiffs be-
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cause the Court will scrutinize more 
closely evidence of discrimination to 
make a prima facie case, and will up-
hold employers' justifications in such 
suits more readily than the lower 
courts. 
The scene then shifts to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion where Stewart's opinion in Occi-
dental Life33 states that the EEOC is not 
barred by the time limits for individ-
ual suits when it files suit for pattern 
or practice violations. Even the state 
statutes of limitation are inappli-
cable. Thus, the time barred individ-
ual can still hope that the EEOC will 
take her situation as part of a pattern 
or practice and obtain for her fic-
tional seniority and back pay which 
she could not get by her own suit 
under Title VII. 
The plaintiff is more and more 
likely to be a female. The struggle for 
recognition of a proper role for 
women in the labor marketplace is 
proceeding on many fronts simul-
taneously. The major substantive 
problem for the Court has been the 
treatment of pregnancy. In General 
Electric v. Gilbert,34 the Court applied 
the standards of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to Title VII in holding 
that Geduldig v. Aiello3s controlled, and 
it was lawful for an employer to ex-
clude pregnancy and its complica-
tions from compensable disabilities. 
The Court noted again that "there is 
no risk from which women are pro-
tected and men are not." The dis-
senters Brennan and Marshall took 
issue with this point, noting that 
prostatectomies, vasectomies and cir-
cumC1sJOn are sex specific and 
covered. However, these sex specific 
procedures do have feminine 
counterparts in hysterectomies, tubal 
ligation and other operations on the 
female reproductive system. There is 
simply no male counterpart for preg-
nancy. 
"The determinative question," in 
the words of Justice Brennan's dis-
sent "must be whether the social poli-
cies and aims to be furthered by Title 
VII and filtered through the phrase to 
'discriminate' contained in §703(a)(I) 
fairly forbid an ultimate pattern of 
coverage that insured all risks except 
a commonplace one that is applicable 
to women but not to men." The 
majority viewed this question as a 
conundrum in which an employer is 
damned if he does and damned if he 
doesn't, for coverage would give 
women a benefit not afforded men. 
Their reply is to allow either choice so 
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long as the choice itself is not shown 
to be rooted in a desire to disadvan-
tage a particular sex. 
The Court may have been influ-
enced by three factors which they do 
not mention. First, the impact of the 
denial of disability benefits commonly 
falls not on the woman alone but on 
the whole family-husband and 
wife-whose combined income is 
diminished by the decision to bear a 
child. Second, while most workers 
will return to the job as soon as their 
disability ceases, a substantial num-
ber of women may choose to remain 
home to care for an infant so that the 
pregnancy is a prelude to termina-
tion of employment and reluctance to 
return to work may make computa-
tion of the period of actual disability 
difficult. Third, the nature of dis-
ability coverage for pregnancy means 
that all workers, male and female 
alike, must share in the costs of some 
women's decision to raise a family. 
While this may be good social policy, it 
is not a clear policy of Title VII. 
Perhaps the most important factor 
in the Court's decision in Gilbert was 
uncovered this term in Nashville Gas v. 
Satty.36 The Court reaffirmed its posi-
tion in Gilbert that exclusion of preg-
nancy from disability coverage was 
lawful absent a motive to discrim-
inate against members of one sex, but 
held that denial of accumulated com-
petitive seniority to women return-
ing from pregnancy leave when it was 
not denied to others returning from 
sick leave was a violation of Title VII. 
The Court emphasized that the denial 
of competitive seniority here de-
prived women of employment op-
portunities because of their sex. 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion draws a 
distinction between benefits and 
burdens. He said that denial of dis-
ability pay was merely a refusal to 
extend a benefit to one class which 
would not be applicable to the other 
class. He then argued that the denial 
of competitive seniority was a burden 
which was imposed on one sex. 
Justice Stevens' dissent pointed out 
the manipulation involved in this 
characterization. "The grant of se-
niority is a benefit which is not shared 
by the burdened class [of women not 
allowed to retain seniority after 
leave]; conversely, the denial of sick 
pay is a burden which the benefited 
class need not bear." He finds the dis-
tinction "in terms of whether the em-
ployer has a policy which adversely 
effects a woman beyond the term of 
her pregnancy leave." He gives no 
justification for this distinction, for as 
his dissent in Gilbert indicates, he dis-
agrees with it. The grounds, how-
ever, may be found in the perceived 
social policy of Title VII reflected in 
§703(a)(2) to prevent deprivation of 
employment opportunities because of 
sex. 
The act on its face indicates no clear 
policy on payments to one sex for a 
sex related cause, but it is designed to 
provide an equal opportunity to work 
regardless of sex. If a man wishes. to 
raise a family, his job will be unaf-
fected, but unless a woman retains 
her seniority, t~e decision to bear a 
child may foreclose her from work. 
When, as in Satty, the employer does 
not show a significant adverse effect 
to his business as a result of retain-
ing seniority, the Court finds a 
violation. 
While the emphasis in Satty was on 
lost employment opportunities, the 
Court also dealt with differences in 
benefit payments last term. In Los 
Angeles v. Manhart,37 the Court held 
that a pension plan which required 
women to contribute more than men 
violated the Title VII prohibition 
against discrimination with respect to 
compensation because of such indi-
vidual's sex. The city argued that dif-
ferent levels of contribution were not 
discriminatory because women have 
a longer life expectancy. The Court 
responded that "individual risks, like 
individual performance, may not be 
predicted by resort to classifications 
proscribed by Title VII." 
The Court distinguished Gilbert by 
noting that pregnancy is sex specific 
while longevity is not. Only women 
become pregnant so pregnancy bene-
fits are given to only one sex (and 
their denial is a denial to one sex). On 
the other hand, some .,;omen have 
short life spans while some men have 
long ones. Thus a classification based 
on sex will result in all women re-
ceiving less take-home pay than men 
during their working years while the 
amount each individual receives in 
pension benefits over his or her life 
span· will vary widely depending on 
their individual longevity. 
The result of the Court's labor deci-
sions in the last two terms should be 
a decrease in the traditional labor 
decisions in the federal courts and a 
diminution in race discrimination 
actions. But increasing public sector 
labor activity, disputes over the rights 
of women and the problems of affir-
mative action will provide a substan-
tial number of cases to keep the Court 
busy in the coming years. 0 
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